EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:			ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
	1	DCI		X		
	2	DDCI	:.	Х		
	3	EXDIR				
	4	D/ICS				
	5	DDI ·		X		
	6	DDA				
	7	DDO				
	8	DDS&T				
	9	Chm/NIC				
	10	GC				
	11	IG				
	12	Compt				
	13	D/Pers				
	14	D/OLL				
	15	D/PAO		-		
	16	SA/IA				
	17	AO/DCI				
	18	C/IPD/OIS				
	19	NIO				
	20	C/DEIG/SC	VA	X		
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Remarks	
	Executive Secretary 16 Apr 85
	Date

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

85- 1588/1

16 April 1985

The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Cap,

As soon as I got back here I looked into the status of the annual costing paper prepared by the CIA. You will remember that we wanted to discontinue this but, largely at the request of the Defense Department, together with some Congressional pressure, we agreed to publish it again. A new version will be out in a couple of months. As we described to you at breakfast a few weeks ago, there will be a new format designed to make it less susceptible to misuse. For example, it will begin with a section on what the Soviets actually have bought, including graphics which portray the accumulation of weapons stocks over a 10-15 year period with some indication of those outputs as a percentage of US outputs. This is a more realistic and meaningful US-USSR comparison than any cost reconstruction.

There will be yet another section which would be to look at Soviet defense burden. At a minimum, this approach includes the cost of empire, the space program, a rough cut at the cost of intelligence, and perhaps two or three other areas where we have sufficient data to enable us to make some sort of estimate. Our guess is that this kind of an alternative will produce a Soviet defense burden that is on the order of 20 percent or more of GNP rather than the 13-16 percent we and DIA have been carrying. Another feature of this approach is that it will underscore some of our important uncertainties that no one has seemed to take seriously when we simply express caveats about the figures.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey

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